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N THE THREE DECADES since the publica-
tion of the seminal work on rational expecta-
tions, a steely consensus has been forged in the
economics profession regarding acceptable
modeling procedures.’ Simply stated, the con-
sensus is that economic actors do not persist in
making foolish mistakes in forecasting over
time. People are presumed to be able to both
detect past patterns in their prediction errors
and base their behavior on the “best possible”
forecast of future economic conditions. In the
classic phrase of Robert Lucas, the predictions
of individuals must be “. . - free of systematic
and easily correctable biases.” The current
wide acceptability of this notion is testament to
the success of the rational expectations
revolution.
Unfortunately, the consensus that in equilibri-
um systematic forecast errors should be elimi-
nated has been insufficient to end the debate in
macroeconomics over expectational assumptions.
In particular, some current research examines
the idea that how systematic forecast errors are
eliminated may have important implications for
macroeconomic policy. Researchers who focus
on this question are studying what is called
“learning,” because any method of expectations
formation is known as a learning mechanism.’
This paper provides a synopsis of some of the
recent research on learning. Three important
points are emphasized within the context of the
survey. The most salient point is the close rela-
tionship between learning issues and macroeco-
nomic policy. In fact, the topic attracts attention
precisely because of its perceived policy implica-
tions. The second point is more subtle: learning
is implicitly an integral part of rational expecta-
tions models, and current research only makes
this fact explicit. There is little prospect that
one can avoid the study of learning by assuming
rational expectations. The third point is that in-
cluding learning in macroeconomic models is
unlikely to either confirm or overturn completely
the results from rational expectations macro-
models. Instead, the concept of rational expecta-
tions equilibrium seems to provide the appropri-
for different readers. This terminology developed because
rational expectations is justified by the notion that people
eliminate systematic forecast errors over time, and the























1The seminal work is Muth (1960, 1961).
2Lucas (1977), p. 224.
‘The phrase “learning mechanism” is used in this paper in
a broad way, even though it conjures up different images
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ate benchmark for the study of learning in that,
when systems converge under learning, they
typically converge to stationary rational expecta-
tions equilibria.
The next section provides a non-technical in-
troduction to learning and rational expectations.
The subsequent section looks at the effects of
introducing learning through a simple example
attributable to Albert Marcet and Thomas
Sargent. Some interpretation and discussion
of the example is offered in the third section,
along with a review of other attempts to intro-
duce learning into macroeconomic models. The
final section provides summary comments.
THE LEARNING IMPLICIT IN RA-
TIONAL EXPECTATIONS
Why Study Learning?
Since decisions made today affecting produc-
tive behavior are presumed to be based, in part,
on individual assessments of the future, macro-
economic theories and models generally have
provided a role for expectations. Around 1970,
however, researchers began to realize that the
policy implications of their models were often
quite sensitive to the choice of expectational
assumptions.4 This failure of robustness has
been increasingly apparent in the last 20 years
and has drawn increased attention to the prob-
lem of how expectations are formed. This line
of research constitutes what has been called the
rational expectations revolution.
A capsule characterization of rational expecta-
tions contains the following themes: (1) In equi-
librium (a steady state in dynamic terms), ex-
pectations are “correct” in the sense that in-
dividuals make no systematic forecast errors;
(2) Individuals use all available information (as
defined by the researcher) in forming forecasts;
(3) Expectations vary with changes in govern-
ment policy; and (4) Individuals know “the
4Sargent (1987) has documented some of this early
research in rational expectations.
‘A more formal approach to defining rational expectations
is pursued in the next section.
6For a discussion of policy along the transition path, see
Taylor (1975).
‘This is the same as saying that learning provides a stabili-
ty theory for rational expectations equilibria. In the best
case, given initial conditions and some parameter values,
statements claiming that the dynamic evolution of the
economy always leads to a particular stationary equilibrium
model” and thus can predict as well as the
economist manipulating the model.’ These are
the tenets of the theory and are often espoused
by its advocates.
The first tenet, the heuristic notion that in-
dividuals eliminate systematic forecast errors, is
the one most responsible for the rise of the ra-
tional expectations hypothesis. In a deterministic
environment, this idea implies that, once learn-
ing is complete, people have perfect foresight.
In a stochastic environment, it means that the
remaining forecast errors are white noise.
Since the consensus is that the elimination of
systematic forecast errors is a sensible postu-
late, all reasonable long-run equilibria must be
rational expectations equilibria. Macroeconomists
generally are interested in the effects of changes
in policy parameters at these steady-state equi-
librium points.’ Given such equilibria, there is at
least one reason why the explicit specification of
learning could matter: in a model with multiple
rational expectations equilibria, the learning
mechanism may serve to select the actual out-
come.7 The next section contains an example of
learning as a selection mechanism.
Representing Learning Via Econ”
ometric Techniques
Macroeconomists generally have avoided speci-
fying explicitly the optimal learning mechanism
underlying rational expectations for a number
of reasons. First and foremost, they considered
rational expectations a shortcut in expectations
modeling that made explicit specification un-
necessary.8 Further, ascertaining the full im-
plications of the rational expectations hypothesis
turned out to be a difficult problem; presumably,
these implications must be understood before
the issue of learning can be investigated.
There was, however, at least one additional
reason why learning was essentially ignored—
explicit specifications of how agents form expec-
can be made. This is called global stability. Alternatively,
one can define local stability, where a particular stationary
equilibrium is stable only if the initial conditions are near
that equilibrium.
‘Lucas’ comment, “ -- take the rational expectations
equilibrium -- -as the model to be tested and view [learn-
ing] as -- .an adjunct to the theory that serves to lend it



















a JANUARY/FEBRUARy 1991tations have often been attacked. In particular,
one key criticism of the adaptive expectations
formulation was that it allowed systematic er-
rors to persist over time.’
The notion of adaptive expectations is essen-
tially that people predict the future value of a
variable via a geometric distributed lag (or Koyck
lag) of its past values. One of Muth’s results was
that adaptive expectations is an optimal predic-
tion method if the variable being forecast follows
a random walk.”’ Muth’s result makes it clear
that, from the beginning, rational expectations
theorists had econometric techniques in mind
when thinking about ways to model optimal
forecasting.
The idea of looking toeconometrics to model
learning obviously can be extended, since the
Koyck lag is only one of many available econ-
ometric techniques. In principle, it should be
possible to take advantage of the developments
in econometric theory to shed light on the prob-
lem of how expectations are formed. Further-
more, if econometric methods are to be applied
to solve the inference problem faced by individ-
uals, a good place to start would be some vari-
ant of least squares regression. This is the logic
behind the recent work on least squares learn-
ing, an example of which is presented below.
‘l’he application of econometric theory to the
expectations problem was vigorously pursued
recently because the mathematical knowledge to
analyze the problem became available.h1 This
technology was developed in the engineering
literature and has been extended to economics
by Albert Marcet and ‘thomas Sargent.’2 Econo-
mists can now determine, therefore, whether it
makes any difference for policy implications if
the learning mechanism behind rational expecta-
tions is explicitly specified. Viewed this way, the
work on learning can be considered part of a
continuing effort to understand the microfoun-
dations of expectations formation.
‘the impetus for a detailed analysis of learning
has come from both advances in research tech-
nology and one pressing problem: many rational
expectations models are characterized by multi-
ple equilibria. Moreover, these different equilib-
ria can have different policy implications, as the
next section illustrates.”
LEARNING AND THE UNPLEAS-
ANT MONETARIST ARITHMETIC
This section examines a simple expository ex-
ample of Marcet and Sargent;14 it is a simplified
version of the “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic”
of Sargent and Neil Wallace.” The example is
meant only to illustrate the types of issues that
can arise; it is not intended as a definitive state-
ment of the effects of including learning in eco-
nomic models. As the next section will discuss,
these effects are still uncertain.
The model’s most important feature is that
there are two steady states (high inflation and
low inflation) with differing policy implications.
At the low-inflation steady state, a permanent
increase in the government deficit implies a per-
manent increase in the stationary inflation rate.
However, increasing the government deficit
leads to lower steady-state inflation if the econ-
omy is in the high-inflation stationary equilibri-
um. Because the policy implications of the model
hinge on the choice, it is desirable to name one
of the stationary states as the more likely out-
come. The policy conclusions turn out to be dif-
ferent under learning as opposed to perfect
foresight, even though systematic forecast errors
are eventually eliminated under learning and
the only possible limit points of the system are
the two perfect foresight stationary states. This
occurs because the stability properties of the
two steady states are altered under learning as
opposed to perfect foresight.
In Marcet and Sargent’s model, fiat currency
is the only money. ‘the model consists of two
‘See Cagan (1956) and Nerlove (1958) for expositions of
the adaptive expectations hypothesis.
“See Muth (1960).
‘‘Formally, the problem is one of stability in a recursive
stochastic environment. This means that the economist
wants to take uncertainty, time and feedback (beliefs affect
outcomes and outcomes affect beliefs) into account in the
same model to find out the conditions under which con-
vergence will occur.
‘25ee Marcet and Sargent (1988, 1989a.b,c).
“The selection of an actual outcome among these potential
outcomes is the subject of a spirited debate in the
macroeconomics literature which is not considered in
detail here. A number of authors have suggested methods
of choosing a unique equilibrium through deeper theoriz-
ing, that is, by applying certain restrictions to the model to
eliminate unsavory equilibria. See, for instance, McCallum
(1983), Taylor (1977) and Evans (1985, 1986). Some recent
evaluations of these selection criteria suggest they are
less than satisfactory. See, for instance, Pesaran (1988)
and Boyd and Dotsey (1990).
“See Marcet and Sargent (1989b).
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equations relating the price level to the stock of
currency. Let p be the price level and c, be the
stock of currency per capita at time t. The model
is given by
(1) p, = AF,p~, + ye,
(2) c, = c,_, + Op,
(3) F,p,÷, fJ,p,
where (1 < A < 1; y,d > 0; p,,c, > 0; and c, > 0
is given. The term ~,p,÷, is the forecast at time
of the price at time t+ 1, where /3, is the ex-
pected (gross) inflation rate at time r. Rearrang-
ing equation 1 with c, on the left-hand side
yields a linear money demand equation. Equa-
tion 2 can be interpreted as a government bud-
get constraint, where the government chooses c,
to maintain a fixed real deficit 6. The model has
some microfoundations, since it can be derived
in an overlapping generations framework with
utility-maximizing individuals. The model gener-
ates time paths for c, and p, given an additional
assumption on how expectations are formed.
The remainder of the section will develop and
compare the results under two alternative as-
sumptions: rational expectations (or perfect
foresight) and learning as described by a least
squares autoregression.
Perfect Foresight Dynamics
First, close the model by assuming individuals
have rational expectations, which in this case is
equivalent toperfect foresight because the model
is deterministic. Then
(4) ~ =
Equations 1-4 can he rearranged to yield:”
(5) P~÷, = [A~ + I dyA~’]- A-’p~ -
A rational expectations equilibrium is a se-
quence (/~jt, that satisfies (5), and it determines
the equilibrium sequences for e, and p. The dif-
ference equation 5 has two roots, /37 and /3,
where 1 < /3,~< (3 < A~’;these roots are the
stationary states of the model. The real govern-
ment deficit 6 is a shift parameter in equation 5.
The differing policy implications at the two
steady states are illustrated in figure 1, which is
borrowed from Marcet and Sargent’s paper. A
“See the appendix for the detailed derivation of this and
subsequent statements in this section.
“The appendix also describes how to determine stability
properties in figures 1 and 2. Only initial values between
zero and A~ are feasible.
pt
permanent increase in the government deficit 6
shifts the entire curve down in the figure. At
the low-inflation steady state, f3 this parameter
change raises the stationary inflation rate. But
at the high-inflation steady state, /3, a perma-
nent increase in 6 lowers the stationary inflation
rate. In the first case, the comparative statics
are “classical,” while in the second they are
“perverse.” Any policy advice about inflation
based on this model differs depending on which
asymptotic outcome is considered more likely to
be observed.
The high-inflation stationary state, /3, is the
attractor for all initial values /3, between /3’ and
A”.” The low-inflation stationary state is at-
tainable only if /3, = /37 If the initial conditions
are between zero and /37 no equilibrium se-
quence exists. Altogether, there are many possi-
ble equilibrium sequences in the model, and
they can be indexed by /3,. Of these, all but one
converge to the high-inflation stationary state
/7’, ~yhere the comparative statics are perverse.
In related work, Sargent and Wallace have
used similar arguments to claim that monetarist
models can yield “unpleasant” results. Under ra-
tional expectations, the “bad” stationary state



















a JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1991eventual outcome for virtually all initial condi-
tions, provided an equilibrium exists.
Perfect foresight is a strong assumption, but it
can be made palatable by arguing that people
eliminate systematic errors in their forecasts
over time. Therefore, perfect foresight may pro-
vide a good approximation once the steady state
has been attained and learning is complete.
Marcet and Sargent have developed techniques
to analyze this argument in detail. Operationally
speaking, people can be viewed as using some
type of statistical technique to infer a future
price from available data. One widely known
technique is ordinary least squares (OLS). The
next portion of the paper analyzes the model
using the assumption of least squares learning.
Least Squares Learning Dynamics
To develop results analogous to the perfect
foresight case under least squares learning,
Marcet and Sargent replace equation 4 with
(4,) /3, = ~ [~ ~8~-] -
People form their forecasts of future inflation
by calculating /3,, which is found via a first
order autoregression using available data through
time t— 1. The difference equation that describes





(5”) ~ = 1 -
1 — 1J3,_, —
While equation 5’ is quite complicated, it can be
interpreted without too much difficulty. Near a
stationary equilibrium, the term (1 — A/3,~jI(1—
A/3,,,,) is close to unity, while the term multiply-
ing the brackets is always between zero and
one. Therefore, near a steady state, equation 5’
states that /3, is approximately a convex com-
bination of /3,, and G(/3,,). That is, near a sta-
tionary equilibrium, the projected gross inflation
rate is a weighted average of last period’s pro-




G(/3,,.,). Alternatively, one can
period’s prediction “updated”
amount.
The possible steady states under learning, /37
and j3, are the same steady states possible under
perfect foresight. This captures the notion that
systematic forecast errors are eliminated over
time and suggests that stationary rational ex-
pectations equilibria provide a good benchmark
for the study of learning. Marcet and Sargent
claim, in fact, that when least squares learning
mechanisms converge, they always converge to
rational expectations equilibria.’~
Now that a method of expectations formation
has been added to the model, however, some
aspects have changed. Marcet and Sargent have
completed an analysis of the complicated dif-
ference equation given by (5’). They show that
equation 5’ describing the dynamics under least
squares learning is closely related to the follow-
ing simpler equation:
(6) /3, = G(/3,,j -
For the purposes of this exposition, it will suf-
fice to analyze (6).” The graph that Marcet and
Sargent use to describe the dynamics of (6) is
given in figure 2.
view (5’) as last
by a certain small
“See Marcet and Sargent (1989a,b,c).
“Readers interested in the actual dynamics under least
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The approximate dynamics under least squares
learning as described by (6) indicate that the
low-inflation steady state /37 is the attractor for
all initial conditions /3,, between zero and /3;.
The high-inflation stationary state is attained
only if /3, = /3;. If /3, is between /3; and A’’, no
equilibrium exists under least squares learning.
The policy advice emanating from this analysis
is therefore approximately the opposite from
that offered in the perfect foresight case. Under
least squares learning, the low-inflation sta-
tionary equilibrium with the classical com-
parative statics is the asymptotic outcome for
virtually all initial conditions, provided that an
equilibrium exists.
It is important to emphasize at this point that
no generic result links learning with “good”
equilibria and rational expectations with “bad”
equilibria. In some other model, rational expec-
tations may be associated with good outcomes
and learning with bad outcomes. Nevertheless,
some may take comfort in the fact that, at least
for the present case, the comparative statics are
once again “classical” under a plausible assump-
tion about how expectations are formed.
Experimental Evidence
So far, the example has illustrated that, while
the potential stationary equilibrium inflation
values are exactly the same under perfect fore-
sight and least squares learning, the stability
properties are approximately reversed, leading
to opposite policy implications. Nothing has
been said about whether perfect foresight or
least squares learning is the better description
of human behavior in this context. Recently,
however, Ramon Marimon and Shyam Sunder
have gathered some experimental evidence that
bears on this issue.”
Marimon and Sunder summarize the results
from a set of controlled experiments that use
students as subjects. Their model is an overlap-
ping generations version of the one used by
Marcet and Sargent. The students were oriented
to the context of the model and asked to fore-
cast inflation, with monetary rewards for more
accurate predictions. The authors were especial-
ly interested in characterizing the actual out-
comes for inflation in the model where the deci-
sions are made by humans.
The results of these experiments indicate that
actual inflation tends to cluster around the low-
inflation stationary equilibrium. Marimon and
Sunder never observed a tendency of the infla-
tion rate to converge to the high inflation sta-
tionary equilibrium in any of their experiments.
Based on the forecasts made by their subjects,
the authors conclude that least squares learning
provides a good approximation to observed
behavior. While the work has some caveats and
is open to interpretation, it at least provides
preliminary evidence on the viability of assum-
ing least squares learning.
LEARNING IN OTHER
MACROECONOMIC CONTEXTS
The notion of a rational expectations revolu-
tion stresses the much greater emphasis that
macroeconomists have placed on the plans of
individuals in macroeconomic models since
1970. One way to think about current research
in the area is to categorize models according to
their treatment of expectations formation. While
most authors want to analyze models where ex-
pectations are “rational,” several different ap-
proaches have been taken. These different ap-
proaches within rational expectations macroeco-
nomics reflect unresolved issues in the theory
of expectations formation. Various views have
been espoused about the specific information
that individuals take into account when they are
planning for the future; such issues become
salient partially because rational expectations
theory does not specify a method of learning.
Thus, at least three different categories of
macromodels that attempt to analyze individuals
with rational expectations can be identified.
Forecast Functions That Use 0,1Ev
Historical Data
The first group contains models in which in-
dividuals forecast using only the history of the
economy as a guide. In the previous example,
for instance, learning was modeled as being bas-
ed on the historical price sequence that people
observed. The approach could be extended
relatively easily to include historical time series
on other variables in the individuals’ forecast
functions. While authors assuming rational ex-
pectations normally do not make statements
about the learning mechanism implicitly under-

















“See Marimon and Sunder (1990).
a JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1991use of available history is what many have in
mind.
Considering the use of historical data only,
one might be tempted to conclude (say, from
looking at the results of the model from the last
section) that the only possible long-run outcomes
are stationary states. In fact, most discussion of
rational expectations applies to dynamic steady
states. This notion of long-run equilibrium as a
stationary state, which dominates most macro-
economic thought, was challenged recently by
an argument that the dynamic equilibrium of an
economy might be periodic or chaotic, even
under rational expectations and perfect competi-
tion.2’ Therefore, the artificial economy may not
converge to any of the multiple rational expec-
tations steady states, instead remaining in a per-
manent periodic equilibrium. Cyclical equilibria
are important because, presumably, policy im-
plications are altered if long-run equilibria are
periodic.”
Forecast Functions That Include
the Beliefs of Others
A second group of macromodels contains
forecast functions where, in addition to histori~
cal time series, the beliefs of others also play a
role.2a Consider, for instance, the view of Cass
and Shell: “In seeking to optimize his own ac-
tions, an economic actor must attempt to pre-
dict the moves of all other economic actors.”4
Such consideration adds a new element to the
inference process.’5 Of course, the notion of in-
teraction among individuals (especially individual
firms) has a long history in economics; it is elimi-
nated in the Arrow-Debreu competitive equilib-
rium framework by the assumption of a large
population.
Still, a participant contemplating a forecast
may well be concerned with the aggregate ex-
pectations of the remaining players, or merely
with the beliefs of one other player, such as the
government in a monetary policy game.” The
game—theoretic macromodels that take this lat-
ter view are structurally very different from
the traditional models, even though they are
both based on rational expectations. Most im~
portantly, they are different in terms of policy
implications: these models often yield “. .-an
equilibrium that is extremely sensitive to the
public’s beliefs about the monetary authority’s
preferences.” This conclusion does not hold in
a model in which individual forecasts are a
function of historical data only, such as the
model of section two, because it excludes the
preferences of the government and the public’s
beliefs about them.
Forecast Functions That Include
Frivolous Variables
When individuals forecast based only on rele~
vant past history, they are sometimes said to be
basing expectations on “fundamentals.” When
deciding what is relevant, however, some people
may rationally take into account what seems to
an observer to be irrelevant information in the
form of a frivolous variable (typically called the
sunspot variable). This variable acquires impor-
tance in determining the actual outcomes of the
economy only because people think it is impor-
tant. The frivolous variable serves only to signal
changes in expectations. Once some individuals
take the frivolous variable into account in form-
ing expectations, it becomes rational for all
others to do so, since the variable actually does
influence outcomes.”
Predictions in models with this type of indi-
vidual forecast function are based not only on
relevant and objectively irrelevant historical in-
formation, but also on the expectations of others,
since the beliefs of others are taken into account
when the frivolous variable is assessed. The
literature on sunspot equilibria provides a third
but distinctly different strain of rational expec-
tations macroeconomics, with distinctly different
policy implications.” In particular, “. -.a con-
“See, for instance, Grandmont (1985). Chaos means that
the equilibrium sequence is aperiodic but bounded and
displays sensitive dependence on initial conditions. For a
general discussion of chaos, see Butler (1990).
“In the overlapping generations model, for example, the ex-
istence of periodic equilibria is disturbing because it im-
plies that welfare varies from generation to generation.
“John Maynard Keynes, for instance, discussed this type of
forecast function in some detail. See Keynes (1936),
p. 156.
2Cass and Shell (1989).
“But not necessarily a strategic element. See Rogoff (1989).
26This theme is outlined in detail in the volume edited by
Frydman and Phelps (1983).
“Rogoff (1989).
“See, for instance, Azariadis (1981).
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sideration of the complete set of possible equi-
libria, [including the sunspot equilibria], associ-
ated with a given policy regime may alter one’s
evaluation of the relative desirability of alterna-
tive policies, relative to the conclusion that one
might reach if one considered only a single
possible equilibrium ...“
The existence of sunspot equilibria raises the
question of whether models with learning have
dynamics converging to them. One author,
Michael Woodford, has shown that exactly this
sort of dynamics is possible.” Also, in general,
the extent of the sunspot phenomenon is wide-
ranging since there are no limits to the number
of possible frivolous variables.
These three approaches to macroeconomics
differ according to their alternative assumptions
about what it means to assume rational expecta-
tions. Since the theory provides no method of
expectations formation (that is, no learning pro-
cess), researchers are free to provide their own:
perhaps individuals base their expectations on
sunspots, or the expectations of others, or a
straightforward application of classical or Baye-
sian inference to historical time series. As part
of the legacy of the rational expectations revolu-
tion, all three approaches place heavy emphasis
on the role of individuals’ views of the future in
influencing current macroeconomic equilibria.
Unfortunately, there is little prospect that
econometric analysis wili decide which version
of rational expectations is correct. Because the
theory is not well-defined, the empirical tests
are unconvincing.” While economists want to
assume that expectations are rational, the im-
plications of this consensus for modeling and
for policy are in doubt.
SUMMARY: THE DIFFICULTY OF
DEFINING OPTIMAL BELIEFS
Several lines of research, each in its own way,
are attempting to extend the rational expecta-
tions hypothesis to include learning. The first
and most obvious is a direct attempt to find
mild assumptions showing that most reasonable
methods of expectations formation converge to
particular types of rational expectations equilib-
ria. If this can be done, the concept of rational
expectations equilibrium can be said to provide
“Woodford (1988).
“See Woodford (1990)
a good approximation to the concept of long-run
competitive equilibrium. This literature, how-
ever, generally ignores the problem of the ex-
pectations of others and of frivolous variables.
Even simple learning mechanisms often have
not yielded the outcomes that intuition suggests
might have occurred. The notion that a reason-
able method of expectations formation must give
rise to a dynamic system that always converges
to a certain a priori plausible rational expecta-
tions equilibrium has been gradually eroded.
The general conclusion so far seems to be that
explicitly introducing learning into macroeco-
nomic models is unlikely to provide a widely ap-
plicable selection criterion for rational expecta-
tions equilibria. That is, in a rational expectations
model with multiple equilibria, introducing a
learning mechanism does not appear to reduce the
set of potential outcomes in any meaningful way.
One reason for this disappointing result is
that it is difficult to define optimal learning. Not
only is the class of plausible mechanisms quite
large, it is also hard to limit the learning techni-
ques under study to one that can be justified by
some optimality argument. One of the biggest
problems is that the usual statistical techniques
are, strictly speaking, inapplicable to the pro-
blem of individual inference in the context of
macroeconomic models.” The source of difficul-
ty is that, in models with expectations, there is
an aspect of simultaneity in the sense that be-
liefs affect outcomes and outcomes affect beliefs.
In order to apply standard inference techniques,
people must be unaware of the effects of beliefs
on outcomes. Making this assumption is unsatis-
factory, however, because it means that individ-
uals ignore relevant and potentially useful in-
formation when forming their forecasts.
Nevertheless, work continues on ways to ex-
plicitly model learning; Marcet and Sargent pro-
vide one example. Some attempt is made to
choose the learning mechanism via an optimiza-
tion criterion, and the asymptotic properties of
the implied systems are then analyzed. This
research agenda is difficult and relies to a large
extent on mathematical machinery only recently
developed to study such systems.
The policy implications of including learning
have been emphasized in this summary of the
recent research. In models with multiple ra-
“Webb (1988).
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1 Appendix Details of the Marcet and Sargent Model
I This appendix provides the mathematical (1 + A-~ ydA~’)±v~i i-~~~yoA-uj2_ ~ details for Marcet and Sargent’s model outlined 2
in section two. For convenience, the model is
I reproduced here; it consists of the three The level of the real deficit 6 > 0 must be equations: chosen such that these roots are real. This
(1) p, = AF,p,÷ + yc, requires
I (2) c, = c,_, + (A.1O) 6 < Ay (A’ + I — (4A~)l~z] = 0,,,,,.
(3) F,p,÷ =
with Q<A<i; y,d > 0; p,,c~> 0; and c0
> ~ The roots also satisfy
given. First close the model under perfect
foresight: (All) 1 < 13; p -c A.
I ~ = - These facts provide the basis for the qualitative
P graph of figure 1.
I Substituting (4) in (1) and rearranging shows To analyze the dynamics of the model using that J3~< A’ is required to be compatible with the graph, consider some initial condition J3~on
> 0. Substitute (3) in (1) to obtain the horizontal axis. Find the value /3, by tracing
I (Al) p = Afip + ~,, up from J3~to the plotted function. The value of now serves as the input for the next period.
(AZ) p,, = AJ3,p,_ + yc,.. To transfer the 13 value to the horizontal axis,
I Rearranging (AZ) trace horizontally from the plotted function to
the 45 degree line, and from the 45 degree line
(A.3) c, = y[p,, — A/3
t,p,_,] down to the horizontal axis. Now repeat the
procedure as though J3~is the initial condition.
I Substituting (2) into (Al) gives Next, solve the model under least squares
(A.4) p = Afl,p, + y[c,_, + dpi. learning. Use
I
Now substitute (A.3) into (A.4): = -t ~
(AS) p, = Afl,p + y[y(p~., — Afl,,p,) + Op,]
In order to get to equation Sin the text, (4’)
(AG) Ap. = 1 — fl~,+ A — yd must be written in recursive form. To do this,
I or, iterating forward and rearranging, define temporarily two vectors
(5) f3’~, = (I + A’ — y61’) — A’fi,’ (A.12) P,_, = [p0,-.., p,_,]’
as in the text. A rational expectations equilibri-
um is defined as a sequence [13,)r, that solves (A.13) P,1
= [p,,-.. p,_21’-
(5). Proceed to analyze (5) as follows: I (A.7) dp,÷, A-’p~2>0 Then
(A.14) /3, = [P~2P,_2]’P~_2P,_,
I (AS) d213,÷, = —2A’fl[’< 0. and
d/3~ (A.15) /3, = [P;,P,_3] ‘
I The roots of (5) are found by setting /3÷,= 13, where now and applying the quadratic formula: (A.lG) ~,_, = [p,---~
I (AS) ~ = (A.17) P,~,= [p0 p,-3].
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The additional information in /3, is the observa- Substituting (A.23) into (A.ZZ) gives the equation
tion p,,. The relationship between /3, and /3,, is in the text:
given by a well-known recursive least squares
formulal which can be applied as follows: (5) ~ p~2 [ (I—A/3,2) G(/3,.,)—/3,_, -
(Ala) /3, = fl,, + [P~,P,-t’p,3(p,, — ~: ~, ~ (l—Afl,,)
A set of positive sequences 1/3,, c,, pj: I
where satisfying (l)-(3) and (4’) is an equilibrium under
least squares learning. To approximate the




’ Pt-2 dynamics under least squares learning, consider
is a scalar. Since the simpler but closely related difference
equation:
(A.Z0) [P3P,3~’ = [:~, P5k] -, ‘ (8) /3, = G(fl,,) = I - fl,i yd - I
the scalar f, can be written as
(A.211f, = [t? ~~1] -, [j1
~, + - The derivatives are given by I
Substituting into (Ala) yields (A.24) = Ayd(l — A(3,, — ydY2> 0 p
(A.22) fi,=fl,,+ ‘-~ [p,, — p,, /3,_I.
~:,P~, (A.Z5) ~ = ZA2yd(l — Afl,, — yd)’ > 0
To obtain equation (5’), use (1), (2) and (3) to
find provided /3 < A’ (1 — yd). This provides the in-
formation for the second qualitative graph,
(A.23) p’, = G(fl,,) I—Afl,2









1See Harvey (1981), p. 54.
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